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Abstract
Effective, sustained innovation remains one of the great challenges facing almost every company in America. But research 
shows that the average firm is failing at innovation most of the time. Using an ethnographic research approach, including 
field research and depth interviewing, the authors of the paper report what executives revealed as the principal reasons 
why their companies are struggling with innovation.
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Introduction
Effective, sustained innovation remains one of the great 
challenges facing industry. Keeley found that the average 
firm succeeds in innovation only four per cent of the time 
(2009), supporting similarly low successful new product 
introduction rates reported by Shilling and Hill (1998). 
There have been many reasons posited for the lack of 
innovation success. Taking a fresh look at the literature, 
these problems were readily grouped into three buckets 
of ideas:  cultural and organizational barriers to innovation; 
strategic and marketing-related barriers to innovation; 
and process type barriers to innovation ( Foss et al, 2011; 
Utterback,1994; Shilling and Hill, 1998; Sharma, 1999).
The purpose of the research reported here was to learn 
how executives presently in industry view the challenges 
facing their companies in the innovation arena, and 
then to see how these perceptions matched up to the 
established precepts of innovation management.  Further, 
we wanted to see if these executives were focusing on 
certain innovation challenges not yet well researched by 
academics with the hope of guiding the future work of 
ourselves and others.
To accomplish this goal, our protocol combined field 
visits with depth interviewing.   We spent time in the 
field with executives, spending several days observing 
their activities and actions at times when, by their own 
agreement, they would be dealing with new products or 
services, or in some instances, running meetings where 
the focus was a new business or a new venture. This 
research method – one of close observation and depth 
interviewing – is called “ethnography” (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007). Our role was simply to observe. 
We then conducted structured interviews, analyzed the 
content, and then populated the framework developed 
from the literature as well as positing new elements as of 
yet not well researched.  This combination of validation 
and discovery forms the basis of this paper.
Innovation Challenges:  the Framework 
Emerging from the Literature
As noted above, as we revisited leading works in the 
innovation field, the literature tended to fall into three 
major categories of thought: cultural and organizational 
barriers to innovation; strategy and marketing-related 
barriers; and process-related barriers.
Cultural and Organizational  barriers:  Numerous 
researchers attribute failure to innovate to corporate 
culture.  Wycoff (2004), for instance, states that 
innovation is not part of the culture of most established 
firms.  This anti-innovation culture directly impacts those 
individuals responsible for carrying innovation forward. 
The idea that culture, among other factors, can impede 
the introduction, absorption, and application of new 
knowledge within a corporation has been formalized 
into the concept of “absorptive capacity” by a number of 
scholars (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998;  Zahra and George, 2002 ).   
Many researchers have also posited that organizations 
are simply not designed well for innovation. Among 
the tenants of the innovation literature focused on 
organizational barriers are the notions of top-down 
command and hierarchical approaches (Kanter, 2006); 
inflexibility to respond to change as well as new market 
and technical opportunities (Abernathy and Wayne, 
1974; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997),  and organizational 
rigidities for transitioning to next generation business 
paradigms (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . Others have argued 
that large corporations require an organizational dualism 
that supports efficiency in core business but allows 
innovation for new business development  (Zahra, 1999; 
Assink 2006). However, the validity of this dualism as a 
solution to innovation has recently been called in question 
(Burcharth and Ulhoi, 2011).
Many of the organizational concepts purported to 
impede innovation are also associated with the siloing of 
organizations – either on a functional basis or separating 
different businesses – to achieve efficiencies in execution 
of immediate tasks. That siloing, however, then impedes 
knowledge and technology sharing between groups that 
is often needed for new product or service innovation 
(Gerstner, 2002; Foster and Kaplan, 2001).  Finally, some 
literature suggests that many organizations are structured 
to impede individual autonomy and experimentation and 
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prevent employees from engaging in innovative projects 
which can be viewed as potentially “career killing” 
(Adomzda et al 2009).
Strategic and marketing-related  barriers to innovation: 
The literature focused on the strategic and marketing-
related elements as barriers to innovation is also broad 
and compelling.  There is a strong stream of literature 
that posits a firm’s self-perception of its mission, purpose, 
market focus, strategic intent, and strategic choice can be 
self-limiting and constrain true innovation (Abell, 1980; 
Levitt, 1975; Abernathy and Wayne, 1974; Utterback, 
1994; Rumelt, 1974; Barghai et al, 1999; Zook, 2004; Foss 
et al, 2011).  For example, Christensen’s work (1997) 
synthesizes industry dynamics and innovation strategy 
by showing how industry leaders become so strategically 
focused on serving the needs of core customers that they 
fail to pay attention and innovate to serve the needs of new 
entrants coming into market. Some have referred to this as 
“milking the cow too long” (Menchin, 2004). Furthermore, 
some researchers have found that companies simply fail to 
understand the linkage between strategic intent and the 
adaptive/absorptive capabilities of the firm and when to 
emphasize these capabilities (Foss et al 2011). 
Process related barriers to innovation:  The processes 
of innovation and their potential to impede or enhance 
innovation success has been a central component of the 
innovation literature for some time (Cooper 1990, 1994; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tabrizi and Walleigh, 1997; 
Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000; McGrath, 2000). In many cases, 
the literature focuses principally on processes involving 
“new product/service development” while neglecting other 
aspects of innovation such as services or business model 
innovation (Heskett et al, 1997).  Moreover, there is much 
discussion as to whether or not formalized innovation 
processes, such as stage-gate systems have actually helped 
or hindered the realization of commercially successful 
innovation (Keeley, forthcoming).  
Finally, substantial research has also focused on the 
methods and processes for clarifying the “fuzzy front 
end” of new product and service development. Failure 
to adequately understand user needs, both present and 
future has been cited frequently as a major innovation 
roadblock  (Dodgson, Gann and Salter, 2005; Schrage, 
2000).  In response to this challenge, there is a growing 
body of work that explores new methods of user research, 
product design, and test marketing  (Leonard-Barton and 
Rayport, 1997; Norman 2002, Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007).  Lead user research – and user as innovator -- 
is also an important part of this research stream (von 
Hippel 1988,  Thomke and von Hippel, 2002).
Study Method
Our literature review showed two basic approaches to 
innovation research:  the use of in-depth case studies in one 
or more companies, from which frameworks and methods 
emerged; or, the administration of questionnaires, from 
which data are gathered, combined, and heavily processed 
into “significant” results to test particular hypotheses. 
Both approaches are valid – and we, too, have engaged in 
both. However, for this study, our desire was to reengage 
directly with executives facing innovation problems in 
real-time, to gauge their reactions and decision-making 
against what we knew from the literature, and from this, 
to find the gaps.
The method we employed ethnography and depth 
interviewing of senior management.  We sat down with 
executives, “off the record,” to ask them about the present 
innovation challenges and as well as the innovative projects 
underway in their companies.  We then spent several days 
within these companies observing employees and teams 
engaging in innovation projects. Forty-three individuals 
agreed to let us join them in staff meetings and project 
work that they deemed to be innovation-focused.  Then, 
in follow-on sessions, we conducted semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews with these individuals.
Our interviewees consisted of CEOs, senior executives, 
heads of R&D divisions, and senior members of innovation 
teams. There was a good cross-section of industries including 
manufacturing, consumer packaged goods, technology-based 
companies and services firms.   The number of corporations 
represented in the study group was 27, and the number 
of individuals, in total, was 43.  These respondents were 
selected based on convenience and judgment and because 
we had access to such companies.
The structured interview portion of our field research 
was guided by the following questions posed to the 
interviewees:
(1) Is innovation an important part of your organization’s 
future growth strategy? 
(2) How satisfied are you with your organization’s 
innovation efforts? 
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(3) Are there any impediments or roadblocks to innovation 
within your organization that you can identify?  
Ethnographic experts and management experts suggest 
that the use of depth interviews is a grounded theory 
approach and when conducted properly can provide deep 
insight into management issues that may not be uncovered 
through surveys or case methods (Fine, 1993; Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 2007). Moreover, Snow and Thomas (2007) 
suggest that this type of field research approach can 
help describe and explain particular phenomena under 
investigation. In this case, the concept under study was 
innovation and/or failure to innovative.
All interviews were recorded, with the respondent’s 
permission. The interviews were then transcribed, 
analyzed and sorted into response categories. The 
sorting process sought to categorize responses into basic 
over-arching themes. Another researcher not involved in 
the field research independently examined the data and 
also sorted the data into thematic categories. The result 
was an inter-rater reliability level of over 95 percent. 
This approach is consistent with methods advocated by 
experts in the field ( Perreault and Leigh, 1989; Lofland 
and Lofland, 1995).
Results:  Perceived Impediments to 
Innovation
All respondents stated that innovation was a crucial 
part of their enterprise’s growth strategy.  Yet, not a 
single respondent was satisfied with their organization’s 
innovation efforts.   As our literature search revealed such 
a wealth of research on different aspects of innovation, 
it should be no surprise the executive ethnography 
revealed a wide range of systemic, enterprise-wide 
innovation problems.  Appendix A provides the profile 
of respondents participating in the study.  (The verbatim 
responses provided by the respondents can be made 
available to anyone reading this paper by emailing the 
contact author).
1. No working definition of innovation
One of the first barriers we discovered was the absence 
of a shared definition of innovation within each respective 
company. While almost all of these publicly traded 
companies used the word “innovation” frequently in their 
annual reports, and strategic plans, not one executive 
could actually provide a working definition of innovation 
that was used throughout their organization. For 
example, one executive stated, “Our first problem is that 
we cannot even define innovation.” Another said, “We 
have absolutely no idea what innovation really is.” Finally, 
another revealed, “We talk about innovation but no one 
understands it.” 
When we asked why this lack of a clear definition becomes 
a barrier to effective innovation management, most 
individuals stated that no clear definition created a major 
problem when it came to resource allocation.   “We say 
we spend money on innovation, but the reality is that 
99.9% of our money goes to incremental developments. 
We aren’t spending any money on real innovation because 
no one is clear on what that means.  We talk a good game, 
but aren’t putting resources into it.”   
It also became clear that executives struggle defining 
innovation when it reaches beyond the confines of new 
product development.  Hargadon’s ideas (2003) on the 
evolving ecosystems of industries and the formation of 
new business models within those ecosystems – iTunes 
being preeminent example -  was readily apparent in a 
number of the executive interviews.  Some of these 
executives were more fearful of being displaced by a 
new business model than caught short on a particular 
technology.  Other executives marveled at the ability of 
industry leaders such as IBM to excel in services while still 
producing new systems and software.   Their companies 
might master one area of innovation but had failed to 
master another.
2. Cultural antibodies to innovation
Most executives revealed that innovation was not really 
a core corporate value. Most pointed to a culture as 
preached versus a culture as practiced mentality. One 
stated, “Innovation is really not a culture value here. We 
say it is, but it isn’t.” Another said, “We say we value 
innovation, but we really don’t. We do not honor ideas 
or support risk-taking and everyone knows this. It is 
corporate schizophrenia and we tolerate it.” Another 
stated, “This organization is not built for innovation, 
culturally or organizationally.” Finally, another executive 
went a step further. He suggested that creativity and 
innovation are discouraged at an early age in our society. 
“Innovation is not supported in our own families or in 
our schools, how do you expect to build a corporate 
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culture of innovation when your people have has previous 
learning that innovation is not valued.” In essence, the 
innovativeness of a company it dependent on its people 
and if those people do not believe innovation is valued, 
or do not view themselves as innovative, it is little no 
wonder may corporate America cannot innovate.
3. Personal, Career Risk and Fear
Deming (1982) stated that in order to optimize the 
performance of any organization, fear must be removed. 
Clearly, the notion of fear was a pervasive theme stemming 
from this research.  “There is no reward for being a 
change agent here,” said one executive. Several other 
executives were quick to point out that fear is a serious 
impediment to innovation in their organizations. One 
executive stated, “In this organization you quickly learn 
not to take a risk. If you do, and lose, in fact, you could 
lose your head.” Another said, “Why would someone be 
innovative here? If you fail, you get fired.” Finally, another 
executive told us, “When it comes down to it, we are 
risk-aversive. No one wants to own failure. And, we fail 
more than succeed with innovation.”  Yet another said, 
“new internal ventures are a career killer.”    
All respondents directly linked these negative associations 
with innovation as being an obvious, and often 
impenetrable barrier to new product line, process, and 
service innovation in their companies.
4. The lack of an effective idea management 
system
Previous research suggests that a lack of a sound idea 
management system is an impediment to successful 
innovation (Wycoff, 2004).  Our ethnography confirmed 
this reality. For example, one executive stated, “Idea 
generation and idea management, that’s our number one 
problem.” Another said, “This organization is bankrupt 
in terms of ideas. We simply re-try what we have always 
done.” Add executive added, “We either have too many 
ideas, and a complete lack of focus. Or, we have too few 
ideas, none of which can survive a simple vetting process.” 
Another stated, “Brainstorming is all we use because we 
don’t have other options.” Finally, another says, “We hire 
consultants and they shove ideas down our throat, ideas 
we would never implement.”
Another executive noted that while his company had an 
extensive stage-gate system for approved ideas, and a 
well-defined process for managing intellectual property, 
ideas that did make it into Stage 1 of the gate system 
or have patent potential got “lost in the system.”   He 
went on to add, “I bet that the hottest new products 
introduced by our competitors over the past ten years 
were ideas that got lost here at one time or another.   We 
have thought of everything on the market – but we just 
haven’t acted on anything. We are own worst enemy.”
The definition of an “idea” goes beyond simply technology. 
As noted by one respondent working on consumer 
products, “We have no lack of new ideas.  We have 
dozens of them.  The problem is, we have no clue what 
these ideas are like as a business, unless they are just 
extensions.  The business uncertainty kills the potential 
good growth ideas.  So instead, all we do incremental 
innovation.  We call it polishing the marbles. 
5.   Either no process, or too much process ! 
The participants fell into two camps:  their companies 
had no effective process for innovation development and 
commercialization, or, an elaborate innovation process 
that actually limited bolder innovations.  Of the former, 
opinions were strongly held. One executive stated, 
“There is no system here with regard to innovation.” 
Another stated, “Our biggest problem is building in 
time for employees to engage in innovation.”  Yet, 
past research has indicated that a lack of time a major 
constraint on corporate innovation is time. Another 
executive responded saying, “There is absolutely no 
training provided for people engaged in innovation. The 
assumption is they will learn the game as they go along.” 
Another executive told us, “It is known that integrated, 
cross-functional teams are a necessary ingredient for 
successful innovation but we ignore this reality. It is 
actually difficult to get our people to be part of such 
teams.”  Another executive stated, “Our approach is seat 
of the pants. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t.” 
One stated, “Our approach is unless you can prove the 
numbers, no way do you proceed with innovation of any 
kind.” Another added, “If there was a good system we 
could buy, we would. What is done in-house is ineffective; 
we simply don’t get any positive outcomes” 
Representative of the “too much bureaucracy” camp was 
a remark from one participant:  “Our phased approval 
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system kills off our innovations because of the way the 
process is designed.  The VPs have to sign off at each gate. 
That simply delays progress; and if you get a “no”, there is 
no chance for a quick fix and approval – everything takes 
another three months.  Plus we have to do it the VPs 
way, make it only on our own assets or sell it through our 
sales force.  That often limits our innovation so much.” 
Another executive also stated, “This company went from 
no innovation process at all to a stifling gated system. We 
can’t seem to find a healthy balance.” Finally, one executive 
reported, “We put Stage-gate in place and thought this 
was the answer. But, people found ways to circumvent it. 
There was a belief we didn’t believe in the system and so 
people worked their way around it”.
6. Lack of progressive and equitable rewards 
to encourage innovation.
Our research discovered that in most organizations there 
was simply no reward to encourage innovation. In most 
cases there were actually disincentives. For example, one 
executive stated, “There is no incentive to innovative 
here.” There are actually disincentives (it means more 
work and no extra compensation).” Another added, 
“Unfortunately, there are no rewards for innovation, 
particularly financial.” Another executive stated, “If you 
do something innovative and it works, you get to keep 
your job. If you try something and it doesn’t you’ll probably 
lose your job. No one is going to be innovative in this 
environment.” Finally, one executive acknowledged, “Your 
performance review here never includes innovation”.
7.  Lack of measurement of results from 
innovation efforts.
Another major impediment to innovation was a lack of 
measurement of results from innovation efforts. This 
creates a vexing situation for people trying to provide 
justification for expenditures on innovation. For example, 
one executive said, ““We do not track the results of the 
innovation spend.” Another added, “No one can show 
a return on innovation dollars spent. So, it is a constant 
battle to get funds for projects.” Just as problematic is 
the fact that some firms say they measure results from 
innovation efforts, but the measurement is short-term 
measurement. For example, one example stated that 
his firm has a mantra, “Do it quick, measure it quick. If 
the results are not there, the project is dead.” Another 
executive indicated that, “We try to use the same metrics 
for innovation that we do for our established businesses, 
and that simply does not work.” Finally, another executive 
stated, “Since we do not start with hard measures of 
success, it is impossible to measure results. So, unless you 
are politically tied in, you’ll have difficulty getting money 
for innovation and proving the investment was worth it”.
8. Lack of fundamental understanding of 
customers and markets.
Another basic theme that was revealed was that most 
companies lack a fundamental understanding of their 
customers and markets. One executive stated, “Our 
R&D people simply develop stuff and have no clue about 
whether or not the customers would want it.” Another 
added, “We do not invest in research, really knowing our 
market. So, it is not surprising we have such a poor record 
of success with new products.” Another respondent said, 
“Our approach is design it and get it out and hope the 
customer salutes the flag. It would be much easier, I think, 
if customer needs were the focus of the effort.” Finally, 
another executive stated, “My organization spends no 
time or money on upfront research and we end up building 
things that no one wants”.
“Winging it” was not uncommon for highly innovative 
ideas in our sample companies.   As remarked by one 
individual: “In our company, the only ventures that get 
funded are those that are, or are presented as, a senior 
executive’s own personal idea.   There is no market 
validation behind it, just gut feel and doing what the boss 
thinks is cool.”   This becomes an impediment to a stream 
of innovation because most often, the boss’s idea does 
not become a commercial success!
9. Not acting on opportunities for innovation.
On the other hand, our research indicated that some 
companies do have a good understanding of their 
customers and markets but are unable or unwilling to act 
on this understanding. For example, one executive stated, 
“We spent a lot of time talking with customers but then 
do nothing with the information.” Another executive 
acknowledged, “Our customers will actually ask us for 
things and we ignore them.” Still another executive told 
us, “I believe a good source of innovation is customer 
complaints. We get them but we see the complaints as 
irritants to us and not as opportunities to innovation.” 
Finally, another executive stated, “We’ve hired consultants 
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in the past who have provided all kinds of opportunities. 
But, we meet to discuss the findings, and nothing ever 
resulted from it”.
10.  Focusing on the big hit.
Many participants spoke about the dichotomy between 
the focus on the one big hit versus a fixation on 
incremental development. For example, one executive, 
stated, “We focus almost exclusively on the next big 
thing. We talk in terms of huge addressable markets 
and screen out the rest of the ideas. Our funnel is very 
narrow and our people realize that unless they have a big 
project they should shut up and not bother presenting 
their ideas.”  The laddering technique we used  on this 
comment revealed why precisely “trying to hit a home 
run every time” becomes an impediment to innovation. 
“The home run rarely works.  We then lose our appetite 
for innovation for three years because we have lost so 
much money.” In contrast, another executive said, “Our 
company never goes for the home run or big hit. Our 
approach is simple product proliferation. We just add 
more SKUs but that is not innovation. Our sales team 
is always coming back reporting that clients need a new 
product variation, and, of course, we create it. No one 
stops to determine if this is the right thing to do, what the 
costs are and what the pay-off will be. We simply end up 
managing more products. This, in turn, consumes all our 
time. There is nothing left for true innovation.”
Conclusions and Implications for Research
This study was an ethnographic investigation of the 
meaningfulness of principles from innovation management 
research for individuals working in mature corporations. 
The sample size, both in terms of the number of 
companies and the number of participants, makes this 
work somewhat exploratory so there is no pretense of 
statistical validity or reliability here.  But close observation 
and discussion is not a numbers game.  Important insights 
can be gained by working intensely with limited panels – as 
long as the research participants reflect a target suitable 
for the research (Hammersley  and Atkinson, 2007).  In 
this study, we believe the intensity and panel size were 
suitable for the purpose.
Much of our work supported that findings of past 
research:  the difficulty of clarifying the “fuzzy front end” 
of new product and service development; the helpfulness 
of a systematic process for managing projects through the 
development pipeline; the utility of multifunctional teams; 
and the fundamental importance of executive sponsorship 
for innovations that carry the firm into new markets and 
new applications.   
The multifunctional team area was particularly interesting. 
All the companies we interviewed viewed constructing 
innovation teams for workflow improvement as well 
as new products and services as requiring people from 
different affected functions. We can only surmise that 
there has been so much written – and written well -- on 
the beneficial aspects of multifunctional teams, over such 
an extended period of time, that forming such teams in 
now accepted practice for any sort of substantial product 
or service innovation  (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987; 
Katzenback and Smith, 1993.)
Our work did, however, reveal gaps in the existing 
research, and that is perhaps its greatest value.   The basic 
definition of the different types of innovation, and how to 
measure effectiveness for each type of innovative effort, 
still remains a mystery to senior management.  The one 
exception in our study was a company that rigorously 
adopted and developed differentiated processes across all 
of its divisions for Horizon 1 (incremental product line 
extensions) versus Horizon 2 (adjacent new product line 
development) versus Horizon 3 (disruptive R&D) efforts. 
Most executives were as interested in thinking about 
how new technologies affected the market strategies and 
business models of their respective corporations.  This 
means that a useful classification scheme for innovation 
must not only be based on a continuum of incremental to 
disruptive, but multidimensional in terms of categorizing 
the market, financial, and organization/business process 
change that accompany the technology component of a 
particular innovation.
The management of new ideas – be they new product 
concepts, new service concepts, or new business model 
concepts – also emerged as a major gap in terms of being 
much needed but not well understood by our participants 
(Teece, 2000; Van de Ven, A. H., & Engleman, 2004). 
“Knowledge management” as applied to R&D also remains 
vague, at best  (Armbrecht et.al, 2001, McDonough et. 
al. 2008).   No company – even two leading information 
technology companies in our sample that develop and 
market commercial knowledge management software – 
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was able to express a structure for classifying, categorizing, 
storing, and nurturing innovative ideas on an enterprise level.
A systematic study of the appropriateness and efficacy of 
business processes for innovation in mature companies 
is also much needed.  Much of the accepted wisdom 
on managing the new product development process 
comes from the original research by Cooper (1990), and 
advanced by McGrath (2000).  During our interviews, 
all companies with sales over $500 million annually had 
adopted a formalized “stage gate system,” often initially 
implemented by a consultancy.  These business processes 
had been adapted over time – some simplified, and others, 
growing more complex over time.  Interesting, however, 
with but several exceptions, all executives specifically 
questioned the efficacy of their management processes 
for innovation that was not incremental in nature.  A 
number of executives indicated that their stage-gate 
processes de-energized innovation within their companies 
because of all the “checklists and paperwork” associated 
with the methodology.  Even Cooper (2008) himself, in 
recent writings, has posited a simplified stage-gate for 
more venturesome innovation efforts. Understanding the 
balance of control in the face of uncertainty for different 
types of innovation would appear to be a worthy objective 
for future research.  Is a structured control system 
always needed for new product, service, or technology 
development?  If so, how much structure, report outs, 
and executive gates are appropriate, and associated with 
successful outcomes on a normative basis?
Our executive ethnography also showed that senior 
management is thinking broadly about innovation, perhaps 
more so than the innovation management academe.   For 
our interviewees, rarely was the attention solely on a 
technology “bit or byte,” but rather, on the implication 
of the technological innovation “for the business.”  The 
executives with whom we spoke also viewed “business 
model” as much more than pure financials.  Instead, 
the consensus definition of the business model was 
how their company participated across the value chain 
of its commercial offerings – range from raw materials 
supply, to conversion and assembly, to route to market, 
with revenue and margin implications all along the way. 
Our research also revealed that he higher the rank of 
the interviewee, the greater the concern and sometimes, 
the confusion, for understanding the business model 
implications of innovation.  “How we make money doing 
what we do” in a company becomes the established context 
for conceiving and evaluating new product, processes, 
and services ideas.  Any idea that challenges or requires 
change to that paradigm tends to die.  While business 
model concepts and cases have been published, normative 
research that connects a taxonomy of business models 
with different types of innovation has yet to appear.  Such 
research might help break through the greatest barrier to 
innovation: how company leaders view the next generation 
of their businesses, and the investment requirements in 
technology, marketing, and new organizational capabilities 
needed to achieve that goal.
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